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ARBITRATION FAILS TO REDUCE FOREIGN
INVESTORS' RISK IN CHINA
Charles Kenworthey Harer
Abstract: Arbitration is often perceived as a fair and efficient method of reducing
risk associated with business transactions and investments. In China, Arbitration is
constrained by statute and local protectionism such that arbitration can fail to live up to
the expectations of foreign investors. Arbitration in China divides all disputes into
domestic or foreign-related disputes, with different procedures for each, and different
standards for enforcement and judicial review of those awards. Local protectionism
presents a substantial risk to foreign parties involved in arbitration. A general lack of
expertise in foreign-related disputes law, and difficulty in enforcing arbitration awards in
favor of foreign parties in Chinese Courts are major problems that investors must
consider. In contrast, Chinese parties that receive arbitration awards will be able to
pursue enforcement in foreign countries based on the New York Convention of 1958.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of thousands of foreigners are investing in businesses with
Chinese parties' without an effective dispute resolution process in place.
Unaware of arbitration's limitations, many foreign investors unquestioningly
adopt arbitration as their dispute resolution process,2 perhaps due to the
success and popularity of arbitration in other parts of the world.3 Arbitration is
a dispute resolution process where a neutral third party, authorized by the
disputing parties and in accordance with certain procedural rules, renders a
decision which is final and binding on those parties.4 Arbitration is currently
the preferred dispute resolution method found in international commercial
1 Jingzhou Tao, Commercial Divorce, CHINA BUS. REV., Nov. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL
10921766. There have been about 316,280 foreign-invested enterprises formed in China since 1979, about
30,000 have dissolved already. Foreign-invested enterprises include joint ventures and wholly foreign
owned Chinese entities. This number does not include business transactions where foreign parties only
trade with Chinese parties. Id.
2 Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the PRC, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 333 (1997).
James H. Carter, Litigating in Foreign Territory: Arbitration Alternatives and Enforcement Issues,
Presentation Before the American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal Education, National
Institute, Doing Business Worldwide (Feb. 8-10, 1998). In discussing why arbitration is so popular in
foreign litigation, the authors make multiple assertions including: i) resulting awards have little risk of
being set aside by courts; 2) arbitration awards are easier to enforce than court awards; 3) there is increased
privacy; 4) the desire for predictability and avoidance of a potentially hostile foreign court is the largest
incentive for choice of arbitration. Id.
4 WANG SHENG CHANG, RESOLVING DIsPuTES IN THE PRC 5 (1996).
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contracts. 5 Features typically desired in international contract arbitration
clauses include: choice of a neutral forum, parties' selection of arbitrators,
choice of law, and protection from prejudice and unfamiliar legal practices.6
The idea that arbitration provides a refuge against the uncertainties of national
courts is supported by the nature of arbitration, and the theory that the process
provides control by the parties in shaping the arbitration proceedings.7
Arbitration has a long history as a means of settling commercial
disputes in China, and its importance and influence has grown significantly
over the last few decades. 8  The Chinese International Economic Trade
Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC") is now the largest international
arbitration tribunal in the world.9 Over the past decade, China has made
significant changes in its international arbitration process in an effort to
conform more with international standards.10
Despite these changes, the Chinese arbitration process remains
protective of local interests," does not allow foreign parties to fashion an
agreement that balances Chinese and foreign interests, 12 and carries little
weight in enforcing awards against a Chinese party. 13  The arbitration
5 Steven J. Burton, Combining Conciliation with Arbitration ofInternational Commercial Disputes,
18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1995).
6 Id. Generally, arbitration awards in international disputes are more readily enforceable than court
judgments; arbitration provides a neutral forum; arbitration protects parties from prejudices and unfamiliar
legal practices; the process allows parties to select arbitrators, and the process allows the parties to tailor
the arbitral procedure to their specific disputes. Id.
Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 334.
8 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 5.
9 Carmen Collar Fernandez & Jerry Spolter, International Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution:
Is Mediation a Sleeping Giant?, 53 DIsp. RESOL. J. 62, 66 (1998). CIETAC arbitrated more than 900 cases
from more than 45 countries in 1996. Of the 723 cases accepted by CIETAC in 1997, U.S. parties were
involved in the largest number with 66 cases, followed by South Korea with 36 cases, and Japan" with 30
cases. China: Business Booms for China's Arbitrator, CHINA Bus. DAILY, Feb. 16, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7594192.
1o Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the PRC, 15 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J., 122, 132-33 (1996). Effective in 1995, CIETAC made major changes to its arbitration rules,
bring them more in line with recognized international standards. These included: 1) permitting foreign
arbitrators; 2) allowing use of other languages if agreed by all parties; 3) allowing use of non-Chinese
lawyers in the tribunal; 4) providing a nine month time limit for a decision; 5) providing that awards are
considered binding and can not be reviewed by courts; 6) providing an alternate "fast track" procedure for
smaller disputes. Id.
1 Jake Stratton, Despite the Opaque Legal Environment, Foreign Companies Continue to Brave the
Risks of Doing Business in China, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10921705.
"China is one of the most difficult countries in the world in which do to business." Id.
12 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 332. International arbitration clauses in multimillion dollar
contracts do not necessarily provide a viable means for resolving disputes or protecting an investment. Id.
13 Id. at 341. Enforcement problems are legendary for victorious parties seeking enforcement of
awards in China. Prevailing parties are routinely unable to enforce arbitral awards. Id.
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process is "stacked against" foreigners due to the lack of choice of forum,'
4
lack of an independent arbitral board,'5 and the requirement that the Chinese
rules be followed.' 6 Enforcement of a Chinese award against a foreign party
will likely be successful in foreign courts, 17 but the Chinese courts will most
likely refuse to enforce an award in favor of a foreign party.' 8 If the Chinese
party to an arbitration agreement does not voluntarily participate and comply
with an award, the arbitration agreement can be a no-win situation for a
foreign party transacting business with a Chinese entity.
While the Chinese government has taken significant steps towards
meeting internationally accepted norms for conducting business and for
resolving international business disputes, further changes are needed.' 9 Prior
to 1982, there was no provision in Chinese law for the enforcement of
arbitration awards. 20 Now there are written arbitration laws, civil procedure
laws, and Chinese membership in the New York Convention; steps intended
by the Chinese government to provide transparency in their legal system as
it affects foreign trade.2'
Despite these apparent efforts to conform to international standards,
Chinese laws are not yet applied rationally and uniformly in a manner
14 Robert C. Goodwin, Jr. & Jennifer S. Casden, Details Make the Difference, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Mar. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10921720. Contract provisions that pose the greatest problems for US
exporters typically are those requiring that arbitration of any dispute take place in China rather than in a
third country. Id.
is Alastair Crawford, Plotting Your Dispute Resolution Strategy: From Negotiating the Dispute
Resolution Clause to Enforcement Against Assets, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC 22, 37 (Chris
Hunter ed., 1995). Despite the introduction of foreign arbitrators to CIETAC, it is virtually unheard of for
a foreigner to be appointed as either a single arbitrator, or as a Chief Arbitrator. Two of the three members
of a board will be Chinese. Id.
16 Benjaman P. Fishbume, III & Chuncheng Lian, Commercial Arbitration in Hong Kong and
China: A Comparative Analysis, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 297, 322-23 (1997). There are no express
provisions in Chinese law allowing parties to select their own procedural rules. The tribunal will follow its
own rules. Id.
'7 Guo XIAOWEN, CASE STUDIES OF CIETAC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES vii (1996). In
accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 10,
1958) [hereinafter New York Convention] arbitration decisions from China are recognized and enforced in
more than 90 countries. Id.
18 See Dexter Roberts et al., Cheated in China? More American Companies Turn to Washington for
Relief from Abuses, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8271885. There is a lack of
protection for foreigners under the Chinese legal system. "The scale of problem is greater than the number
of publicized cases would indicate, because most companies keep quiet about their troubles with Chinese
ventures for fear of retaliation by local officials." Id.
19 Stanley B. Lubman, There's no Rushing China's Slow March to a Rule of Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13991303.
20 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 166.
21 Lubman, supra note 19. The World Trade Organization requires transparency in legal systems of
its members in publishing laws that affect foreign trade, and requires rational and uniform administration of
the laws. Id.
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consistent with World Trade Organization requirements.22 Efforts to make
China more transparent to outside investors are undermined by the country's
decentralization, which gives local officials significant power.23  The
concept of the supremacy of law is absent in China, where the legal system
does not yet have the independence and stature of its counterparts in western
countries.24 This structure does not yet provide protection to foreign entities
doing business in China, and "China's tortuous passage to a credible system
of dispute resolution still appears endless. 25
Faced with the rather gloomy prospects of obtaining and enforcing
favorable arbitration agreements and awards in China, and the dismal view
of the Chinese national courts toward foreigners, why do foreign investors
still seem to flock into China to do business? One possibility is that foreign
investors settle most of their disputes through more amicable means like
mediation and conciliation.2 6 Given the large number of invested foreign
entities (in excess of 300,000)27 and the small number of disputes handled by
CIETAC (723 in 1997),28 fewer than three out of every thousand foreign-
invested companies have a dispute each year severe enough to proceed to
arbitration. Alternatively, the numbers indicate that most disputes are either
handled by the courts, or the foreign parties simply accept whatever the
Chinese party chooses to give them.29 Certainly some companies assume
the risk that if they have problems in their Chinese business ventures, they
will simply lose their investment.30  Others come to the realization when
31problems occur that their legal options are not worth pursuing.
2 Jeff Logan & William Chandler, Incentives Needed for Foreign Participation in China's Natural
Gas Sector, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11541560. Transparency is one of the
most difficult barriers to overcome in order to do business in China. "This refers to clarifying contracts,
pricing, legal issues such as arbitration, and who has final decision-making authority. The commonly
accepted ways of conducting international business are not always followed in China. Legal and financial
practices should be clarified and brought closer in line with international standards." Id.
23 Stratton, supra note 11.
24 Richard H. Holton & Xia Yuan Lin, China and the World Trade Organization: Can the
Assimilation Problems Be Overcome?, ASIAN SURV., Aug. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13064625.
25 China: No Redress, Bus. CHINA, Sept. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16823923.
26 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 6. For example, the people's conciliation system resolves
six to seven million disputes each year. Id. See also id. at 33-47 for discussion on conciliation.
27 Jingzhou Tao, Commercial Divorce, supra note 1.
29 China: Business Booms for China's Arbitrator, supra note 9.
29 China: No Redress, supra note 25.
30 Stratton, supra note 11.
31 China: No Redress, supra note 25. "The lack of any effective mechanism to resolve contractual
disputes has meant that when business relationships sour, there are rarely adequate means to obtain redress
from the wayward partner." The author additionally describes the arbitration process as "an expensive and
protracted lottery." Id.
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The potential for profit combined with ignorance of the systemic
problems with the dispute resolution process may lead many investors into
situations from which they later cannot recover. There are disagreements
among scholars about the level of difficulty in using arbitration in China,
and about the objectivity of the process. On paper the system appears
reasonably fair and enforceable. 32 Statistics from the Secretariat of CIETAC
indicate that among all the awards rendered by CIETAC, fewer than five
percent had to go to the courts for enforcement, and less than eight percent
were denied enforcement.33  Conflicting recent information shows an
increasing number of applications for enforcement of CIETAC awards in the
Chinese courts, and that the courts enforce only about two-thirds of the
awards brought before them. 4 Popular sentiment is that China has a
relatively high perceived level of corruption,35 and the lack of protection for
foreign investors through arbitration and the courts is a much bigger problem
than indicated by the cases that have been publicized. 36  Corruption on a
broad scale is widely recognized as a major problem in China.
37
The current state of foreign-related arbitration in China indicates that
if the Chinese party chooses not to participate in the arbitration process and
comply with an award, a foreign party has little recourse. If the foreign
party wins in arbitration, it is not likely to collect absent enforcement
through the courts.3a If a foreign party loses in an arbitration tribunal to a
Chinese party, the Chinese courts will likely enforce the award, and the
Chinese party stands an excellent chance of pursuing enforcement of an
award in the foreigner's home country.
39
32 Jingzhou Tao, Editor's Notes: CIETAC Arbitration Rules, 1 China L. Reference Service (Asia L.
& Prac.), Ref. No. 1450/98.05.06 (1998).
33 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 180.
34 China: No Redress, supra note 25. Applications for enforcement of CIETAC awards in the
Chinese courts increased from eight per year in 1991, 1992, and 1993, to twelve in 1994, 34 in 1995, and
64 cases in 1996. Of the 1996 cases, 21 were not enforced by the Chinese courts, 43 applications were
enforced by the Chinese courts. Id.
35 Stratton, supra note 11. The legal environment in China has inadequate dispute resolution
mechanisms, tends to breed corruption, and is commonly cited by foreign companies as a prominent feature
of the PRC business environment. In 1997, China ranked number 12 of 52 countries in terms of its
perceived level ofcorruption. Id.
36 Roberts et al., supra note 18. Regarding the lack of protection under the Chinese legal system, most
companies keep quiet about troubles with Chinese ventures for fear of retaliation by local officials. Id.
37 Holton & Xia Yuan Lin, supra note 24.
38 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 336. More often than not foreign investors will need to seek
enforcement in Chinese courts. Id.
39 Guo XIAOWEN, supra note 17.
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This Comment will look briefly at the background of arbitration in
China,4 ° including a look at the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of
China, the separation of domestic and foreign-related dispute resolution, and
CIETAC. Then it will examine disparities between international arbitration
theory in China and actual practice; examine problems foreigners may have
with the bifurcated Chinese arbitration system; discuss practical problems
foreign entities experience in conducting arbitration in China; and examine
difficulties foreign parties experience with enforcement of arbitral awards
with the Chinese. The Comment concludes that foreign investors in China
may better protect assets in their home country by avoiding an arbitration
agreement, because the Chinese parties will have more difficulty attaching
the foreign party's foreign based assets with a Chinese court judgment than
with a Chinese arbitration award.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA
Chinese society regards use of adversarial proceedings, including
arbitration, as a last resort to settle disputes, because it indicates a shameful
failure to settle matters amicably.41  China continues to rely on non-
adversarial processes of discussion, mediation and compromise to resolve
disputes and continue business relationships between parties after disputes
have been settled.42 Many Chinese statutes and rules strongly encourage or
require mediation as an alternative to arbitration, 43 and even the CIETAC
arbitration rules allow mediation (conciliation) of disputes under its
authority if either party requests it and the other does not object."
In contrast, absent amicable resolution of disputes, the international
community emphasizes arbitration for dispute resolution,45 and many
investors consider it the most efficient method of resolving international
40 See generally Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China:
History, New Developments, and Current Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539 (1995) (detailing the
history and process of international arbitration in China); WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4 (detailing the
process of arbitration in China); DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, supra note 15 (detailing the laws and
rules of international arbitration in China).
41 Michael F. Hoellering, World Trade to Arbitrate or Mediate-That is the Question, 49 DIsP.
RESOL. J. 67 (1994).
42 Crawford, supra note 15, at 23.
43 Fernandez & Spoltner, supra note 9, at 68.
44 Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize (Xiuzheng) [CIETAC
Arbitration Rules (Revised)] art. 45, translated in 1 China L. Reference Service (Asia L. & Prac.), Ref. No.
1450/98/05.06 (revised and adopted May 6, 1998) [hereinafter CIETAC Rules]. Article 46 allows CIETAC
to conduct mediation in the manner it deems appropriate.
45 Fernandez & Spoltner, supra note 9, at 67-68.
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commercial disputes.46 A cursory analysis of international arbitration in
China indicates that foreign parties in internationally related agreements
with Chinese parties can control the arbitration process they will use,
choosing with whom and where to arbitrate, the language to be used, and
procedures to be followed.47  Investors accept arbitration because. of an
independent character that does not exist in court.4 8 Autonomy of the parties
is a basic principle in the arbitration system of countries worldwide.
49
The National Congress of the People's Republic of China adopted the
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China in 1995. This was
China's first law specifically enacted to regulate both domestic and
international arbitration.50  The legislation was an effort to normalize
economic relationships between China and foreign parties.5 ' The Arbitration
Law provides that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement must meet
specific criteria.52 The mandatory elements of an agreement to arbitrate are:
1) a clear declaration of the intention to submit disputes to arbitration; 2)
specificity of what matters are subject to arbitration; and 3) the selection of
an arbitration commission.5 3 If the first two elements are not clearly written
into the agreement, it is void; the tribunal may be selected at a 
later date. 54
The Arbitration Law provides that the validity of an arbitration
agreement may be challenged in the arbitration commission or in Chinese
courts.5 5 If an arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to the choice of
tribunal, a supplemental agreement to decide this issue is allowed, but failure
46 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 539-40.
47 Jun Ge, supra note 10, at 132.
48 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA 103 (The Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China ed. & trans., 1997). See
also id. at 17-100 (providing background and guidlines regarding formulation of the Arbitration Law, and
annotations to the translated text of the Law).
49 id.
50 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 540.
51 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcaifa [Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China]
art. 16, translated in ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 48 [hereinafter Arbitration Law].
52 Id.
53 DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, supra note 15, at 183 (editor's commentary on the Arbitration
Law).Lw "An arbitration agreement shall contain the following particulars: 1) an expression of intention to
apply for arbitration; 2) matters for arbitration; and 3) a designated arbitration commission." Arbitration
Law art. 16.
55 A party challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement "may request the arbitration
commission to make a decision or apply to the People's Court for a ruling. If one party requests the
arbitration commission to make a decision and the other party applies to the People's Court for a ruling, the
People's Court shall give a ruling." Id. art. 20.
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to agree will invalidate the entire arbitration agreement.5 6 If challenged in
court, local law will govern challenges to the validity of the arbitration
agreement and the arbitrability of the specific dispute. 7 When parties
dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement and raise the issue before
both an arbitration tribunal and a PRC court, the decision of the court will
prevail if the decisions conflict.
58
The Chinese system of arbitration established under the Arbitration
Law is bifurcated.5 9 Disputes are classified as either domestic or foreign-
related, and separate tribunals and procedures are provided for each.6°
Domestic and international arbitration have separate laws, rules and
regulations. 61 China established an arbitration tribunal for international trade
disputes in 1954, but it arbitrated only thirty-eight cases between 1956 and
1979.62 Following name changes in 1980 and 1988, this tribunal became the
China International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC"),
and it has broadened its jurisdiction to include any dispute arising from
international economic and trade transactions. 63  The China Maritime
Arbitration Commission ("CMAC") also handles a small number of
international cases each year.64
Until recently, foreign traders and investors in China were required to
use CIETAC for all international arbitration.65 CEITAC has revised its rules
to bring them more in line with recognized international arbitration
standards. 66  The parties are permitted to designate languages other than
56 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, Settling Out of Court, New Rules Codify Existing Practices in an
Attempt to Improve Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Awards, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8669523.
37 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 335.
53 Id. at 340.
59 Vivienne M. Ashman, New York Convention and China's 'One Country, Two Systems,' N.Y.L.J.,
July 2, 1998.
60 Id.
61 Jun Ge, supra note 10, at 129.
62 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 541.
63 Id.
6 China: Courts Handle Maritime Cases, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7598316. China Maritime Arbitration Agency handles only 20 international cases a year. It is the only
Maritime arbitration agency in China, and has 97 maritime law experts. Id.
65 Carter, supra note 3, at 4.
Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 339-40. Trends indicating compliance with international
standards include:
China's enhancement of the Arbitration Law;
CIETAC awards being enforced outside of China;
CIETAC's large case load;
CIETAC's list of arbitrators including younger arbitrators with exposure to foreign legal
systems;
foreign arbitrators being allowed on the Arbitration panels;
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Chinese for an arbitration proceeding. 67  The list of CIETAC approved
arbitrators includes a number of non-Chinese nationals whom the parties
may select. 68 At least on paper, the Chinese international arbitration practice
is now in line with international norms.
69
The last decade has seen significant increases in the use of arbitration
to settle disputes between Chinese and foreign parties, most handled by
CIETAC.7 ° CIETAC now handles more intemational arbitrations each year
than any other international arbitration tribunal world wide, with 902 cases
admitted in 1995,71 and 723 cases in 1997.72 According to CIETAC
statistics, of the cases concluded in 1995, 82.6% were concluded by award,
7.1% were concluded by mediation or conciliation, and 10.2% were
withdrawn.73 Of the CIETAC cases, about half relate to international trade,
and about a third relate to joint venture disputes with overseas partners.7 4
Confirmation of arbitral awards by the Chinese courts includes
recognition of the award and enforcement of the award. 75  Recognition
means giving effect to the award to bar litigation on the same issues settled
in arbitration, enforcement means applying judicial remedies to assure that
the award is carried out.76  In 1986, China joined the Convention of
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 ("New
York Convention") to make its arbitration awards effective in foreign
countries.77 Depending on the type of arbitration, the courts may use
different standards to review the process and decision of the arbitration
board.78  While a CIETAC award is usually considered final, in review of
the use of non-Chinese attorneys by parties being allowed, and;
Chinese is not the only language being allowed in the process.
Id.
I 67 Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 323.
68 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 113. In 1996 there were 350 arbitrators on the CIETAC
main panel of arbitrators: 260 Chinese nationals; 64 foreign nationals from over 20 countries; and 26 Hong
Kong citizens. Id.
Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
70 China to Strengthen Trade Arbitration. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 1998, available in 1998
WL 4802283.
71 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
72 China to Strengthen Trade Arbitration, supra note 70.
73 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 69-70. Conciliation is a process where a neutral third party
helps the disputing parties negotiate an amicable settlement agreement. The conciliator may or may not
make settlement recommendations. Id. at 6.
74 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 542.
75 Carter, supra note 3, at 7.
76 Id.
77 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 548.
78 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 156. Grounds for setting aside domestic as compared to
international awards: 1) domestic award can be set aside for defect in substance (merit defects); 2)
domestic awards may be set aside for failure to follow arbitration law, but nonconformance with tribunal
MARCH 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
domestic arbitration awards, Chinese courts can review the legal reasoning
of an arbitration award as well as the procedures used, meaning an arbitral
decision is not final.79
III. CHALLENGES FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN USING ARBITRATION TO
SETTLE DISPUTES WITH CHINESE PARTIES
A. Arbitration in China: Disparities Between Theory and Practice
In theory, the Arbitration Law allows a foreign party to negotiate a
balanced arbitration agreement tailored to its needs. 0 The arbitration
process should provide parties control to shape the arbitration proceedings,
but in practice, this control is not allowed in China.8' The following
paragraphs explain why foreign parties have no realistic option but to accept
terms of an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration in a Chinese
tribunal, conducted in the Chinese language, before a panel comprised
mostly of Chinese nationals, using Chinese procedural rules.
In practice, foreigners must agree to arbitration in a Chinese tribunal,
because the Chinese government need not approve contracts with arbitration
agreements that provide for tribunals outside of China, and the Chinese
courts may void those agreements. 82  A number of regulations and legal
provisions specifically "recommend" that foreign-related disputes go to
CIETAC. 3 Chinese contract provisions typically require that arbitration
take place in China rather than a neutral country. Even if the parties have
contracted for arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction, the Chinese courts can
nullify the parties' choice.85  This nullification could void the entire
agreement to arbitrate because venue is one of the three required elements in
the agreement to arbitrate. 6
rules do not automatically cause awards to be set aside; 3) if subject matter of the award is non-arbitrable,
the award may be set aside. Id.
79 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 347.
go Arbitration Law art. 4. Arbitration "shall be on the basis of both parties' free will and an
arbitration agreement reached between them." Id.
s Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 334.
82 Id. at 345.
83 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 542.
4 Goodwin & Casden, supra note 14.
s5 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 345.
96 If an agreement contains no or unclear provisions concerning the matters for arbitration or the
arbitration commission, the parties may reach a supplementary agreement. If no such supplementary
agreement can be reached, the arbitration agreement shall be null and void. Arbitration Law art. 18.
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There are additional barriers to the selection of non-Chinese
arbitration tribunals. Under Chinese law, PRC companies need government
approval to engage in foreign trade, and then only have limited capacity to
enter into agreements. 87  Foreign forums are unpopular with local
authorities, which often pressure joint ventures into selection of a domestic
tribunal before approving their contracts.88 Selection of a foreign tribunal,
therefore, leaves an arbitration agreement subject to being voided by the
government or the courts.
Certain kinds of disputes are prohibited from arbitration, or must be
directed to specific administrative tribunals. For example, Article 3 of the
Arbitration Law expressly excludes certain disputes, including
administrative disputes that must be handled by administrative authorities.8 9
Other matters not arbitrable include marital disputes, adoption, guardianship,
fosterage, succession disputes, and situations where agreements are void
because the subject matter cannot be legally arbitrated.
9°
The Arbitration Law also codifies the exclusion of PRC government
departments from arbitration and provides that their disputes be settled in
administrative tribunals or the Chinese courts.91 Because most foreign trade
agreements with the Chinese are with state owned entities,92 administrative
agencies may have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes with which they
are involved. Other disputes cannot be agreed to be arbitrated because a
Chinese government agency has assumed jurisdiction. For example, the
Chinese National Copyright Administration created a Copyright Protection
Center to arbitrate copyright disputes.93  Issues of patent validity are not
arbitrable under Chinese law and can only be adjudicated by the Patent
Administrative Authority.94  As a result of government exclusions,
foreigners run the risk that the arbitrability of a dispute will not be
87 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
88 China 's Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution: Rough Justice, Bus. CHINA, Feb. 2, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 16823697.
8' WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 78. An arbitration agreement shall be void if the agreed matter
for arbitration exceeds the range of arbitrable matters as specified by law. Arbitration Law art 17, § 1.
90 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 79.
91 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
92 China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the World Trade Organization,
1997: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Trade, of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Robert R. Aronson, Chairman of Revpower Limited) available in 1997 WL 14152874
[hereinafter Statement of Robert Aronson].
93 China Sets Up Copyright Protection Center, CHt NA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Sept. 23, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 13494614; see also Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural
Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 81, 117 (1996).
94 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
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established until after it has developed, or arbitrability may be challenged
when enforcement of an award is attempted.
Although the Arbitration Law allows for a choice of languages in
conducting an arbitration, in practice, Chinese is the only language parties
can use.95 Chinese is still the official language of CIETAC, although parties
are allowed to mutually agree to use an alternate language. 96  Parties are
rarely able to reach mutual agreement to adopt an alternate language, and are
left with Chinese by default. Though not specified in the Arbitration Law,
foreigners should assume that disputes handled in domestic arbitration
tribunals will require that the Chinese language be used.98
In practice, the autonomy of parties to appoint arbitrators of their
choice is limited.99 Although the Arbitration Law allows parties to jointly
select the presiding arbitrator, if they do not agree, the chairman of the
tribunal will select that member.l°° If at CIETAC, arbitrators must be drawn
from a list maintained by CIETAC."° The foreign party may chose one
arbitrator on a panel of three, 10 2 and the Chairman of CIETAC appoints the
Chief Arbitrator. 103 This selection process ensures a majority of arbitrators
on every tribunal are Chinese.1 4 It is virtually unheard of for a non-Chinese
national to be appointed chairman (Chief Arbitrator) of a tribunal.105  The
appointment of the Chief Arbitrator is significant because in the event of a
" The Arbitration Law is silent on language, but Article 73 allows foreign-related arbitration rules to
be formulated by the China International Chamber of Commerce. The parent organization for CIETAC is
the China International Chamber of Commerce. Jingzhou Tao, Editor's Notes: CIETAC Arbitration Rules,
supra note 32. CIETAC Rules Article 75 allows for an alternate language other than Chinese for the
arbitration.
96 Fishbume & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 323.
97 Sally A. Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals: Arbitration in China, 52 DISP.
RESOL. J. 72, 74 (1997)[hereinafter Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals].
9s Chinese is the required language of the arbitration under the procedural rules of the domestic
tribunals. Sally A. Harpole, Editor's Notes: State Council General Office, Several Problems to be
Clarified Concerning the Thorough Implementation of the <<PRC, Arbitration Law>> Circular,
translated in 1 China L. Reference Service (Asia L. & Prac.), Ref. No. 1450/96.06.08 (1997) [hereinafter
Harpole, Editor's Notes on State Council Circular].
9 Fishbume & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 320. The arbitrators must be drawn from the
panel maintained by CIETAC. See also CIETAC Rules arts. 24-27 (regarding selection of the arbitrators
and the CIETAC Commissioner's role in that selection).
'00 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 48, at 69.
101 Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 319. See also CIETAC Rules arts. 24-27.
102 CIETAC Rules art. 24.
103 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 547.
'04 Id. The parties may jointly agree to the appointment of the chief arbitrator, but in the event they
do not agree, the chief arbitrator is appointed by the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission.
ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 48, at 69.
105 Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals, supra note 97, at 74.
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deadlock among arbitrators, the opinion of the Chief Arbitrator will form the
basis of the award.' 6
In practice, foreign parties cannot adopt their own procedural rules for
the arbitration process. 107 There are no provisions in Chinese law allowing
parties to select their own procedural rules, and presumably, a tribunal will
follow its own rules. 0 8 The domestic arbitration tribunals have no foreign
national arbitrators, and no proper rules to apply to foreign-related
arbitration. 109 The procedural rules for the domestic commissions state that
procedures for foreign-related cases shall be uniform with the rules for
domestic cases."
0
Additionally, consistent with China's civil law tradition, CIETAC
tribunals have the power to conduct their own investigations and collect
evidence on their own initiative."' Any arbitration tribunal may collect
evidence as it considers necessary.' 2  This independent investigative
authority could open the arbitration up to a broader scope than a party
desires, causing additional delay and expense in the process.
As a result of these practical constraints on arbitration, foreign investors
find themselves with no realistic option but to accept terms of arbitration
agreements which provide for arbitration in a Chinese tribunal, conducted in
the Chinese language, before a panel comprised mostly of Chinese nationals.
The publicly espoused fairness and the contention that the Chinese dispute
resolution process conforms with intemational standards may convince
foreigners that their interests are protected when in practice they are not.' 13
B. China's Bifurcated System ofArbitration
A significant unsettled issue relating to Chinese arbitration of foreign-
related disputes is the bifurcated system that designates disputes as either
domestic or foreign-related, and provides separate tribunals and procedures
'06 Arbitration Law art. 53. See also Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 560.
107 Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 322-23.
108 Id.
'09 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 23.
110 Harpole, Editor's Notes on State Council Circular, supra note 98.
. CIETAC Rules art. 38. Article 39 allows the tribunal to consult experts, and to require parties to
produce experts/appraisers and related information, documents, property or goods for browsing, inspection,
and or appraisal by the experts/appraisers. Id. art. 39. If CIETAC does investigate, it may need to offer
opportunity for parties to comment on their findings. Fishbume & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 324.
112 Arbitration Law art. 43. If the tribunal uses an appraiser, the parties may question the appraiser
subject to the permission of the arbitration tribunal. Id. art. 44.
13 Jingzhou Tao, Commercial Divorce, supra note 1. "Chinese local authorities tend to be charming
and demonstrate great hospitality when foreign investors shop for a place to invest. However they tend to
be absent or reluctant to advocate for the foreign investors' interests when a dispute arises." Id.
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for each. 14 The arbitration process differs between the foreign and domestic
tribunals, with the domestic tribunals exhibiting significant shortcomings for
the foreign investor.115 There is currently confusion among the Chinese
courts and CIETAC about what disputes are foreign-related; about what
tribunals are competent to hear foreign-related disputes; and about how the
foreign business entity's structure will affect the choice of forum." 6  The
result is that foreign parties may find themselves unable to participate in the
tribunal they have selected in an arbitration agreement. 117
The Chinese authorities disagree about what arbitration tribunals can
settle disputes involving foreigners and foreign-related transactions." 8 The
Arbitration Law does not expressly define what disputes are domestic or
foreign-related. 119 In theory, CIETAC has jurisdiction over any foreign
party, but disputants can challenge CIETAC's jurisdiction in Chinese courts,
which have the ultimate say in who does have jurisdiction. 120  The Chinese
courts have not been favorable towards foreigners in determining when a
dispute is international or foreign-related, or if it meets the additional
requirement of being commercial in nature.121
While CIETAC revised its rules in 1998 to clearly accept disputes
concerning foreign funded businesses,' 22 the State Council and the courts
appear to be pushing more disputes into the domestic arbitration tribunals. 1
23
A 1996 notice from the State Council contains provisions that end
114 Ashman, supra note 59.
115 Domestic arbitration commissions are considerably less attractive than CIETAC to foreign
investors due to the lack of foreign arbitrators and weaker technical capabilities. Jingzhou Tao, Editor's
Notes: CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 32.
36 Although CIETAC has extended its own jurisdiction to include foreign-invested enterprises, the
People's Court has refused to enforce CIETAC awards in the few cases it has heard that involved foreign-
invested enterprises. Id.
117 If a Chinese company has not been approved by the PRC government to enter into a foreign
commercial contract, the contract and any included arbitration agreement will be void under Chinese Law.
Donald Lewis, Editor's Notes: PRC Arbitration Law, translated in 1 China L. Reference Service (Asia L.
& Prac.), Ref. No. 1450/94.08.31 (1994).
11 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
"9 Arbitration Law, Part Seven: Special Provisions on Foreign-related Arbitration, which includes
Articles 65 to 72. Article 65 states only: "This part shall apply to the arbitration of disputes arising from
economic, trading, transportation and maritime activities involving a foreign element." Id. art. 65.
120 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
323 Fishbure & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 310. CIETAC rules do provide that CIETAC has
jurisdiction in virtually all foreign involved disputes, but the courts often disagree. Id. CIETAC Rules
Article 2 provides jurisdiction over economic and trade transactions, whether contractual or non-
contractual, between foreign legal persons and Chinese legal persons. CIETAC Rules art. 2.
322 China to Strengthen Trade Arbitration, supra note 70.
123 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56. Chinese courts classify disputes involving foreign
entities on a case-by-case basis. Only disputes involving foreign and PRC enterprises that involve
international transactions tend to fall within CIETAC. Other kinds of disputes involving the same entities
will be classified as domestic. Id.
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CIETAC's exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes, and makes it
more difficult to designate CIETAC in arbitration clauses in standard-form
government contracts. 124 At the same time, CIETAC is attempting to assert
jurisdiction over more potential disputes, including those disputes involving
Chinese legal entities engaged in foreign business relations. 1 Although no
foreign entity should voluntarily submit to domestic arbitration, in the end,
many have no choice. 126
The State Council has expanded the authority of the domestic
arbitration tribunals to handle foreign-related disputes as well as domestic
disputes, 127 prompting several domestic tribunals to take steps to attract and
accommodate foreign-related disputes. 128  The new CIETAC and State
Council rules allow a large degree of overlap between CIETAC and the
domestic arbitration commissions. 29 The State Council now suggests that
standard-form contracts designate only domestic arbitration tribunals,
making it more difficult to arbitrate before CIETAC. 30 There are now 120
domestic arbitration commissions competing with CIETAC for foreign-
related dispute resolution.
131
This competition for jirisdiction may have severe consequences for
foreign investors. For example, the use of a foreign-owned Chinese
corporate entity to limit liability and protect assets in a foreign parent
company's home country will likely make CIETAC unavailable to resolve
disputes that arise, forcing disputes before domestic arbitration tribunals!'
3 2
Chinese registered entities are considered Chinese legal persons under
Chinese law, and as such, CIETAC cannot have jurisdiction over them.
133
124 Harpole, Editor's Notes on State Council Circular, supra note 98. See also Brown & Rogers,
supra note 2, at 345. The 1996 notice from the State Council contains significant provisions that end
CIETAC's exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes, and makes it more difficult to designate
CIETAC in arbitration clauses in standard-form government contracts. Id.
125 China: CIETAC to Expand Arbitration Scope, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 29, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7595422.
26 China's Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution: Rough Justice, supra note 88.
127 Sally A. Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, CHINA BUS. REv., Sept. 1, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 10921747. Notice was issued June 8, 1996. Id.
128 Sally Harpole, Tradition of Middlemen Remains an Arbitrary Solution to Disputes, Familiarity
with New Laws and Rules on the Mainland Arbitral System Are a Must, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 13,
1998, available in 1998 WL 22024921 [hereinafter Harpole, Tradition of Middlemen].
129 Id.
130 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 345.
13 China: CIETAC to Expand Arbitration Scope, supra note 125.
132 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 344.
133 Id. The 1995 revised CEITAC Rules allowed CIETAC to arbitrate foreign-related matters
between two Chinese legal persons. However, in 1996 the Shanghai Municipal Intermediate People's
Court ruled that CEITAC did not have jurisdiction over two Chinese legal persons, despite the CEITAC
Rules. Id. The current CIETAC Rules continue to allow jurisdiction over two Chinese legal entities if one
is at least partially foreign-invested. CIETAC Rules art. 2,
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The popular Chinese legal interpretation, which is supported by Chinese
Court decisions, holds that any dispute between Chinese registered entities,
regardless of whether they are foreign-invested, shall be deemed a domestic
dispute unless the matter in dispute is clearly international in nature.
134
Courts can refuse to enforce arbitration agreements that are "beyond the
arbitral authority" of CIETAC. 135 Therefore, while CIETAC is willing to
arbitrate an agreement between Chinese legal persons, if one of the parties
challenges jurisdiction in court, the case can be removed from CIETAC.
The Chinese Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to determine which
disputes are foreign-related, making it unclear if even those Chinese entities
that are entirely foreign owned could enforce an arbitration agreement
designating use of CIETAC.' 36 The inability to ensure that an arbitration
would be conducted before CIETAC significantly reduces the appeal to
foreigners Of an arbitration agreement to settle disputes.
The uncertainty of whether a foreign investor will find itself settling a
dispute before a domestic tribunal or CIETAC presents a significant risk to
foreign parties.' 37 Under the Arbitration Law, China applies different sets of
rules and procedures to foreign-related versus domestic arbitration both in
conducting the arbitration and in enforcement of arbitral awards. 38 It is
unclear if foreign or domestic dispute resolution procedures will govern
foreign-related disputes when they come before domestic tribunals. 39 If the
arbitration is determined to be a domestic arbitration, the specific local
tribunal will determine the applicable rules, because no uniform rules have
been adopted for use by local arbitration associations.140
In addition, foreign parties finding themselves in domestic tribunals
will face other difficulties. In domestic tribunals, delays and expenses can
be great when the stakes are high; skilled arbitrators may not be available;
interim protection measures for disputed assets may be unavailable; and it
may be difficult to join third parties or compel them to give evidence.' 4' For
many types of disputes, Chinese arbitration procedures lack comprehensive
discovery mechanisms, and foreign parties cannot adequately protect
134 Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals, supra note 97, at 73.
131 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 179.
136 Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 311.
137 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 346.
138 Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, supra note 127.
139 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 346.
140 Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 307.
4' Don J. Lewis et al., Domestic Commercial Arbitration in the People's Republic of China, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, supra note 15, at 74, 91.
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themselves. 42  Domestic tribunals have a problem finding sufficient
numbers of competent arbitrators to operate the tribunals, and because the
Arbitration Law has open-ended qualification standards, they allow for
questionable competence of the arbitrators.143 These issues make claims that
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation in court appear increasingly
unfounded.'44
Finally, local protectionism is a major obstacle in the effective
operation of the domestic arbitration tribunals. 45  Despite efforts by the
Chinese government to separate the arbitration commissions from the PRC
• administrative control,' 46 political and administrative interference in the
domestic arbitral process is still a distinct possibility. 47 The foreign investor
faces significant disadvantages in participating in the domestic arbitration
tribunals, yet due to the uncertainty of the current law, is also unable to
ensure an alternate more favorable tribunal in an arbitration agreement.
C. Practical Problems with Conducting Arbitration
The following paragraphs explain how the arbitration process in
China presents several challenges and uncertainties to the foreign investor.
Some disputes are not subject to arbitration or will not be covered by an
arbitration agreement; the process is time consuming and expensive; the
problems of the Chinese legal system affect the arbitration process;
protection of assets in dispute is difficult; and, the predictability of an
arbitral decision is uncertain.
Foreign parties using arbitration agreements could find themselves in
disputes that are not covered by the agreements. Prior to the Arbitration
Law of 1995, non-contractual disputes including fraud and other torts could
not be arbitrated.148  Now the Arbitration Law states that non-contractual
disputes can be arbitrated, including disputes such as patent infringement
'42 Edward J. Fitzpatrick & Heidi C. Chen, PLI's SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 1996, at 381 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series,
No. 454, Sept. 1996.)
143 Lewis et al., supra note 141.
'44 Burton, supra note 5, at 637.
145 Lewis etal., supra note 141.
14 Arbitration Law Article 14 states that arbitration commissions shall be independent from
administrative authorities. Arbitration Law art. 14.
147 Lewis et al., supra note 141.
148 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56. In 1985, Swiss Industry Resources tried to enforce an
arbitration agreement against China National Technical Import & Export Corp. The Chinese court refused
to enforce arbitration because the dispute was a tort action of fraud, not a contract dispute. The Chinese
appellate court affirmed. Id.
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and protection of intellectual property. 149 While authorities claim that non-
contractual disputes are clearly arbitrable, 150 the parties must have an
agreement in place to arbitrate those disputes.' 5' Patent or copyright
infringement by Chinese parties with whom a foreign entity has no contract
will not be covered. If an arbitration agreement has not specified that it
covers fraud or other non-contractual claims such as patent or copyright
infringement, the foreign party will not be protected.1
52
The arbitration process can be very time consuming when considering
the process leading up to arbitration, the process of the arbitration itself, and
the enforcement of an award. Although an unchallenged arbitration may be
faster than the Chinese judicial process, speedy relief is unlikely. 153 For
many disputes, especially involving technology or intellectual property,
Chinese arbitration will not be fast enough to be a satisfactory dispute
resolution process.154  Chinese arbitration, like international disputes
generally, are prone to frequent delays because of distance, difficulties in
communication and language.
155
Moreover, there may be litigation attempts by the Chinese party to
avoid arbitration. 156  Because of cultural pressure to resolve disputes
amicably, arbitration tribunals may stay the proceedings until mediation or
other measures conclude. 157 If the losing party refuses to honor an award,
additional time for enforcement must also be considered, as the winning
party usually must wait for the expiration of time limits given for the losing
party to comply before seeking court enforcement.158
When timeliness could be a major concern, foreign investors should
specify in advance a time limit for mediation or conciliation rather than
leaving these options open-ended. 159 The requirements of CIETAC are that a
tribunal must rule and make an award within nine months of the formation of
the tribunal, but that time may be extended if CIETAC considers it
149 id.
'5o Fishburne & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 314.
1s1 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
152 The types of disputes are to be specified in the agreement. Arbitration Law art. 16.
153 Carter, supra note 3, at 1.
154 Fernandez & Spoltner, supra note 9, at 68. "Arbitration dominates the international dispute
resolution field, but 'clients will be voting with their feet' in the direction of mediation since arbitration has
become so expensive, time-consuming and marked by difficult-to-enforce awards." Id.
15 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at n.30.
156 Carter, supra note 3, at 2.
' WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 54.
'58 Id. at 165. The time limit for enforcement of an award if neither party is an individual is six
months. Ge Liu and Lourie, supra note 40, at 564.
159 Fitzpatrick & Chen, supra note 142, at 397.
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necessary. 160  The nine-month period does not start until after the tribunal
reviews the claim and response, the parties select their arbitrators, and the
CIETAC chairman selects a chief arbitrator. 16  CIETAC determines the
sufficiency of an application for arbitration, and can ask for additional
materials or clarification. 162 Only when CIETAC determines the completeness
of the application will it notify the parties of additional 
steps.' 63
Additionally, the arbitration process for foreign investors can be very
costly. Administrative costs for CIETAC are high, especially compared to
the nominal cost to file a case in the Chinese courts. 164 Fees can range from
tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars for the 
process. 65
A request for a non-Chinese arbitrator requires a party to deposit additional
fees of about US$7,000 depending on the location of the arbitrator. 166 If the
Chinese party refuses to participate or refuses to honor the decision of the
arbitration board, the expense of arbitration will be increased by the
litigation expense the foreign party will incur in the courts.
Furthermore, arbitration in China is directly tied to China's court system
and will always be subject to the court's limitations.' 67  Corruption is
commonly cited by foreign companies as a prominent feature of the PRC
business environment, bred by a legal environment that lacks adequate dispute
resolution mechanisms.' 68 The Chinese have an emerging framework of rules
governing commercial transactions, and are slowly acquiring a consciousness
of legal rights, which were unknown in traditional Chinese society and were
'60 CIETAC Rules art. 52. See also Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals, supra note
97, at 77.
161 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 557. To commence arbitration in CIETAC a claimant must
submit application with evidence, appoint its arbitrator and pay applicable fees. Id. CIETAC is not bound
by any time limitation for review of application, and CIETAC decides if it is complete. CIETAC Rules art.
15. Respondent then has 45 days from notice from CIETAC to respond. Id. art. 17. Arbitration may
proceed unaffected by the lack of response. Id. art. 21. Only after both parties submit their choice of
arbitrators will the chairman of CIETAC appoint the chief arbitrator, and on this date the tribunal is
officially formed. Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 557
162 Harpole, How China Organizes Arbitral Tribunals, supra note 97, at 77.
163 id.
164 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at n.30. For a US$2 million dispute, the arbitration filing fee is
US$19,500, plus US$10,450 to US$45,000 per arbitrator. Id. The minimum and maximum arbitration fee
per arbitrator in a matter valued at US$5 million are US$17,450 and US$96,500. Hunter, supra note 15 at
29.
165 Crawford, supra note 15, at 29.
166 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 135. Amount of deposit ranges from US$6,500 for Hong
Kong, Japan, or Korea resident arbitrators, to US$7,500 for more distant arbitrators. Id.
167 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 348.
168 Stratton, supra note 30. In a 1997 survey, China ranked twelfth out of 52 countries for perceived
level of corruption. Id.
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deformed by communism. 169  Consistent application of existing legal
principles remains a problem in China.'7 In addition, the writing and practice
of laws in China are intentionally ambiguous so that policymakers and
officials have flexibility in interpreting and implementing them.' 7 1 This legal
environment, within which foreigners must conduct and enforce their
arbitration agreements, poses additional risk to foreign investment.
During the lengthy arbitration process, the disputants run a risk that
assets available to fulfill an award will disappear, leaving nothing for the
winning party to recover. Chinese Civil Procedure Law provides for
emergency protection of property, but the Arbitration Law does not.1 72 The
Civil Procedures Law of the PRC requires that arbitration commence prior to
application in court for property protection, and the tribunal must make the
request. 7 3  Notification to the other party of pending arbitration provides
them an opportunity to dispose of property that could otherwise satisfy an
award. 174 In foreign-related arbitration, CIETAC must rule first on the need
for property protection, which then must be submitted to the Chinese courts
to have any effect. 175 In about thirty percent of CIETAC arbitration cases
the parties seek property preservation, but the courts will deny such requests
absent a security guarantee by the claimant. 76  A foreign party must
therefore put additional assets at risk to provide the security guarantee to
protect the assets already in dispute.
The arbitration process in China is prone to bias, and may lack
expertise in deciding foreign-related cases.' 77 Even when a foreign party is
successful in keeping a dispute within CIETAC, the arbitration process may
169 Lubman, supra note 19. The author states there is no principle in China that law is supreme, and
conflicts between the law and the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party have not yet been addressed.
Id.
170 Fishbume & Chuncheng Lian, supra note 16, at 331.
171 Holton & Xia Yuan Lin, supra note 24. The authors suggest that the laws are intentionally vague,
and provide too much room for disparate interpretation by Chinese officials and businesspersons to allow
China to function in the World Trade Organization. Id.
172 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 562. In foreign-related arbitration, if a party requests
preservation of evidence, the tribunal shall submit a request to the courts. Arbitration Law art. 68.
13 If a party requests preservation of property, the arbitration tribunal shall submit an application to
the Intermediate People's Court either at the place of domicile of the person with the assets, or where the
property is located. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China] art. 258, translated in 3 China L. Foreign Bus.: B. Reg. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 19-201, at
23,919 (April 9, 1991) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law].
174 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 562.
175 When a party requests property preservation measures, the commission shall transmit the
application to the People's Court. CIETAC Rules art. 28.
'76 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 562. Emergency requests for property protection can be
granted by the courts in as little as 48 hours, but only after the arbitration commission has determined it is
necessary. Id.
'7 Fitzpatrick & Chen, supra note 142, at 397.
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not provide a competent and impartial forum. While the list of arbitrators
now includes many non-Chinese panelists, CIETAC foreign arbitrators are
poorly compensated, and therefore less likely to accept many CIETAC
appointments. 178 Chinese arbitrators are also poorly compensated, receiving
only about US$100 per arbitration. 179 A Chinese arbitration body may lack
technical expertise, and if it seeks the help of Chinese experts, those experts
may be biased against a foreign party in the same manner that an individual
arbitrator may be. 8 ° With any Chinese tribunal, the arbitrators may be
influenced by a superior authority who could compel the arbitrator to vote
with bias in favor of a local party.' 8' Finally, Chinese arbitration is subject
to all of the problems that can plague any arbitration as a dispute resolution
process, including the tendency to split the difference rather than finding one
side right or wrong.'
82
Furthermore, an arbitration panel may not act consistently with
applicable Chinese law, for example, by recognizing unwritten implied
amendments to contracts, despite a clear legal requirement that contracts be
made and amended in writing' 8 3 Therefore, a correct legal interpretation of a
contract and applicable law does not ensure that a party will prevail in
arbitration on that issue. Moreover, a foreign party losing in arbitration will
have no appeal process. 84 An erroneous ruling by CIETAC cannot be
challenged in the courts based on the merits of the case or errors of law.
18 5
Given the potential for bias on an arbitration panel, an error of law is more
likely to favor a Chinese party and leave a foreign party no possibility for
review.'86
D. Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
Enforcement of awards granted to foreign parties poses a major
challenge to the Chinese arbitration process. 87  If a losing Chinese party
17 Crawford, supra note 15. A foreign arbitrator can expect to be paid about US$1000, less than they
typically can command in other areas of the legal profession. Id.
1" Id.
:80 Fitzpatrick & Chen, supra note 142, at 398.
' Id.
182 Carter, supra note 3, at 2.
183 Guo XIAOWEN, supra note 17, at 187.
'" CIETAC Rules art. 60. A party has 30 days to ask the arbitration tribunal to correct errors in the
writing, topography, computation or similar errors contained within the award. Id. art. 61.
1 5 Hunter, supra note 40, at 185. CIETAC awards can not have judicial review of errors of law made
by the tribunal. This approach is generally in keeping with the wishes of the international business
community, making the tribunal's decision final. Id.
'&6 Arbitration Law art. 9. A system of a single and final award shall be practiced for arbitration. Id.
187 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 336.
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voluntarily complies with an arbitration award, enforcement is not an
issue.188 However, if a losing Chinese party does not, the foreign party must
seek enforcement through local courts, which present a variety of challenges
and tend to protect Chinese parties. CIETAC rules state that its arbitration
decisions are final, and that neither party may appeal to the courts, 89 but the
arbitration tribunal has no power to enforce the award. 190 Foreign investors
who "obtain a favorable arbitration award against a Chinese party more
often than not will be forced to seek enforcement from Chinese courts."'191
Among the reasons cited for the delay in China's admittance to the World
Trade Organization is China's spotty record in honoring international
arbitration awards. 92  In principle, the rules governing enforcement of
arbitral awards from CIETAC or any other international arbitration body
leave little discretion but to enforce awards, but in practice the Chinese
courts do as they please. 193 There are different problems with Chinese court
enforcement of awards from Chinese tribunals than from foreign tribunals,
and other issues involved when enforcement of a Chinese arbitration award
against a foreigner is sought in the foreign party's home country.
1. Chinese Judicial Enforcement of Chinese Arbitration Awards
Foreign parties may have difficulty convincing the Chinese courts to
enforce any arbitral award in their favor. The Arbitration Law defines
specific circumstances when awards need not be enforced, including when a
court determines that enforcement is against Chinese social or public
interest. While a CIETAC award is usually considered final, in review of
domestic arbitration awards, the courts are free to review the legal reasoning
of the award as well as the procedures used, meaning a domestic arbitral
decision is not final.' 94 The Chinese Court systems suffer from a lack of
qualifications and resources, as well as local protectionism. Chinese courts
may decline to enforce any arbitral award, and allow awards to be set aside
'88 ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 48, at 120. According to CIETAC, 90 percent of
awards rendered are performed by the parties automatically, and less than 10 percent required court
enforcement. Id.
"89 CIETAC Rules art. 60. "The arbitral award is final and binding upon both the disputing parties.
Neither party may bring a suit before a court of law or make a request to any other organization to revising
the arbitral award." Id.
'90 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 165.
191 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 336.
29 Id. at 348.
193 China 's Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution: Rough Justice, supra note 88.
1 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 347.
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if the court finds justification. 195 The losing party in an arbitration may also
petition the courts to request that an award not be enforced.'
96
Reasons for refusal to enforce or to set aside an award are set out in
China's Civil Procedure Law, Article 260 and include: 1) when there is no
binding arbitration agreement; 2) where the parties did not receive proper
notice of the proceedings; 3) when a party is unable to state opinions or
arguments due to reasons beyond its control; 4) where the tribunal or process
did not conform with the arbitration rules; 5) when the award exceeded the
scope of the arbitration agreement or is beyond the jurisdiction of the
arbitration body; or, 6) if the Chinese court believes the award is contrary to
Chinese social and public interests. 97 The Arbitration law supplements the
list, and allows the court to set aside an award if: 1) an award is based on
false evidence; 2) a party has withheld evidence which would affect the
results of the arbitration; 3) an arbitrator conducted himself in an illegal
manner; or 4) the award is clearly inconsistent with the law.'
98
The Arbitration Law empowers the courts reviewing both foreign and
domestic arbitration awards to set aside an award if it determines that the
award is contrary to Chinese "social or public interests."' 199 "Social and
public interest" has on occasion been broadly interpreted by the courts to
justify non-enforcement of an award. 2°  Some judges base their
interpretation on the economic and social consequences that would befall the
local community in the event enforcement is granted. 20 1  The Chinese
intermediate courts have denied enforcement of CIETAC awards finding
that enforcement would seriously harm the economic interest of the State
and the public interest of society. 202  This interpretation allows courts to
refuse enforcement of awards at their own discretion.
195 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 554.
:96 Id. Following such a request, the court must announce its ruling within two months. Id.
' Civil Procedure Law art. 260. See also Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 551.
'" Arbitration Law art. 63, (referencing Civil Procedure Law art. 217). This allows the court to
decline award enforcement where the law has clearly been applied incorrectly. Id. CIETAC Rules provide
that an arbitration award is final, even if it is clearly inconsistent with Chinese law. CIETAC Rules art. 60.
'99 Arbitration Law art. 58. "Where the People's Court determines that the arbitration award violates
the public interest, it shall rule to set aside the award." Id.
200 Crawford, supra note 15, at 42.
201 Id.
202 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 179. In 1992, the Zhengzhou Intermediate People's Court
denied enforcement of a CEITAC award. Pursuant to state policies and regulations, the court found
enforcement would seriously harm the economic interest of the state and the public interest of the society.
This ruling "failed to provide logical and lawful reasoning." The Chinese court's interpretation was
inconsistent with the New York Convention meaning of public policy that would legitimately allow refusal
to enforce an award. Id.
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The bifurcated system of arbitration separating foreign and domestic
disputes increases the uncertainty of whether a foreign party can enforce an
arbitral award. If the arbitration cannot be successfully retained within
CIETAC, there is greater doubt as to whether the arbitral awards are final,
binding, and enforceable. 20 3 Enforcement of foreign-related awards rely on
a determination that no procedural irregularities occurred in the arbitration
process, but courts can review domestic awards on procedural and
substantive issues of the arbitration.204 For domestic arbitration awards, the
courts may examine the merits of the case and the decision of the arbitration
tribunal.20 5 In addition to procedural irregularities, the court will not enforce
awards if they find evidence for ascertaining the facts insufficient or other
errors of law. 20 6 If the court finds fault with the process or the decision, the
court may not modify the award; it may only set it aside and ask the
arbitration tribunal to re-hear the arbitration.20 7
Many of the courts are not capable or not qualified to handle requests
for enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards.20 8 The Chinese court
system is extremely inefficient due to a lack of resources and staff,2° 9 and
chronic under-funding.2 10 Chinese courts are often unaware of international
law or may choose to ignore provisions of international law related to
enforcement of international arbitration awards.2 11 There are also reports of
local judges reviewing the merits of CIETAC decisions due to their lack of
knowledge that the decision cannot be challenged under the law.2 12
Following the State Council mandate to allow foreign-related cases in
the domestic tribunals, procedures for enforcement of foreign-related awards
became even less certain. The New York Convention is no help to the foreign
party, since it applies only to arbitration awards made within other member
203 Harpole, Tradition of Middlemen, supra note 128.
204 Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, supra note 127.
203 Arbitration Law art. 58.
206 Harpole, Tradition of Middlemen, supra note 128.
207 Arbitration Law art. 58 (allowing the award to be set aside); art. 61 (allowing a court request for
the arbitration tribunal to re-arbitrate the dispute). The court may not modify an award, only set it aside.
The court can ask the arbitration tribunal to re-hear the arbitration and will stay all its proceedings during
that process. Ge Liu and Lourie, supra note 40, at 554 n.88.200 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56.
209 Daniel Behrendt, Computer Software Copyright Law in the PRC, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL.
1, 21 (1996).
210 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 342.
211 Xiaomin Sun & Ying Zeng, supra note 56. Applicable laws include the New York Convention,
Arbitration Law § 7, and the Civil Procedure Law art. 257. For additional information on the New York
Convention see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, NEW YORK CONVENTION (Giorgio Gaja ed.,
1978), including official translations of the Convention in Chinese and other languages, and national
judicial decisions interpreting the Convention from around the world.
212 Crawford, supra note 15, at 43.
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countries, not to foreign-related arbitration awards made within China.
213
Adding to the foreign party's enforcement difficulties is the requirement that
foreigners file suit to enforce arbitration awards in the local area where the
losing party is located and is known.214 Local party and government officials
frequently interfere with litigation that threatens local enterprises.
215
When foreign parties sue for enforcement of arbitration awards in
local Chinese courts, local protectionism may prevent collection of any
money.216 For smaller companies especially, stonewalling by Chinese courts
is a familiar hazard.217  As recently as 1992, China's central authorities
openly acknowledged the problem of local protectionism.218  Systemic
protections against bias in local courts have been slow to emerge.
2 19
Probably the most serious obstacle is the influence of the Communist Party
and local government over judges in the decisions of the courts.220  The
Chinese legal system is skewed against strangers. 221  American attorneys
find local protectionism present in all cases, and the decisive factor in
decisions by the courts.222
Even when the Chinese courts recognize the validity of an arbitration
award, they may fail to actively enforce the award. The possibility of
arbitration to secure a binding resolution to an international commercial
dispute is not comforting.223 The arbitration award is merely a piece of
paper, dependent for execution on the often elusive cooperation of local224
officials. Law enforcement is problematic because of informal codes and
213 Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, supra note 127. The New York Convention only
applies to relationships that China determines are commercial in nature. Id. The time limit for enforcement
of an award if neither party is an individual is six months. This period of time for filing an enforcement
application is very short. Enforcement of CIETAC awards in China is not governed by the New York
Convention. Ge Liu and Lourie, supra note 40, at 563.
214 Crawford, supra note 15, at 42. Local protectionism is made worse because the party seeking
enforcement must take the application for enforcement to the Intermediate People's Court where the
"losing" party is domiciled or has its assets. Id.
2%i Lubman, supra note 19.
216 Id.
217 Roberts et al., supra note 18. Large foreign corporations have greater power and will suffer less
abuse in Chinese court than smaller firms since they can take their grievances to higher government levels
to resolve them. Stratton, supra note 11.
218 Hunter, supra note 40, at 43.
219 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 333.
220 Crawford, supra note 15, at 42.
22, Statement of Robert Aronson, supra note 92.
222 Id. (quoting Matthew D Bersani, an attorney with Paul, Weiss, Reficind, Wharton & Garrison,
New York and Beijing).
223 Andre G. Gigon, China: Enter at Your Own Risk, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, available in 1997
WL 14813803. The author is a director of Tetras, a French company that won an arbitration award and
could not collect.
224 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 342.
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customs based on personal connections and relationships.225 These informal
codes can be especially troubling for smaller companies, and in remote parts
of China where local officials' power may go unchecked.226
If the Chinese courts refuse to enforce CIETAC awards, the parties
may re-arbitrate, or the parties may proceed to the Chinese courts to litigate
the matter normally. However, if the court refuses to enforce the award due
to tribunal composition, or because the award is contrary to Chinese social
or public interest, it is not clear that the courts have jurisdiction to rehear the
case. 227  If the People's Court has denied enforcement of an award, the
applicant still has a valid arbitration agreement, which a party may try to get
enforced in a different location.228 However, most Chinese businesses do
not have assets in other countries that could be attached to fulfill an
award.229 Refusal by the Chinese court to recognize or enforce an award is,
therefore, a substantial risk to foreign parties.
2. Chinese Enforcement of Foreign Tribunal Awards
Enforcement of awards from foreign arbitration tribunals against
Chinese parties is even more difficult than enforcement of Chinese awards.
China's participation in the New York Convention was supposed to facilitate
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Chinese courts, but actual
enforcement is limited by a lack of resources and expertise in the Chinese
courts, a lack of knowledge by Chinese courts about the New York
Convention, and local protectionism.
Despite signing onto the New York Convention in 1987, the Chinese
courts have often been unwilling to accept or enforce foreign awards.23° In
1997, the Beijing Supreme Court ordered that all international arbitration
awards were to be enforced, but this ruling is widely ignored by the local
courts. 23 1 China is considered a "one-way street;" Chinese awards are
225 Stratton, supra note 1I.
226 Id. The possibility of costly legal disputes arising between foreign and Chinese parties remains a
significant risk for investors. Id.
227 Ge Liu & Lourie, supra note 40, at 565.
228 WANG SHENG CHANG, supra note 4, at 185. The applicant can attempt enforcement in another
country where the agreement is recognized, or can re-arbitrate the dispute in an effort to get an award the
court will enforce. The party can also abandon the arbitration award and sue in the People's Court to settle
the dispute. Arbitration Law art. 9.
Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 336.
230 Swedish Arbitral Award Enforced in Beijing, INT'L COM. LIG., June 1, 1998, available in 1998
WL 13328926.
231 Peter Seidlitz & David Murphy, Foreigners Stuck in Legal Trap, Mainland Courts are in the
Dock, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22023925.
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automatically enforced in other New York Convention signatory countries,
but it is still very difficult to enforce foreign awards in China.232
Chinese courts should base decisions to refuse enforcement of foreign
awards on Article 5 of the New York Convention,233 but in practice, the
courts have tended to do as they please.234 A court may simply refuse to
accept an application for enforcement of an arbitration award by a foreign
party.235 When an American company was granted an award by the Swedish
Arbitration Institute against a Chinese state-owned business, the Shanghai
Court refused receipt of the award for two years, and failed to enforce the
award for at least two more years.236 After a French company had won an
award from a Chinese company, a Chinese court recognized the award as
binding, but refused to notify the parties of its decision, effectively blocking
the enforcement mechanism and execution of the award.237  The refusal of
the Chinese Court to recognize or enforce a foreign award will effectively
render the award worthless.
3. Enforcement of Chinese Awards in Foreign Countries
Given the difficulties that foreign parties face in convincing the Chinese
courts to enforce an arbitration award, the chances of settling a dispute
favorably seem poor. The foreign investor entering into arbitration should also
consider the result of an award against the foreign party. The foreign party
stands a significant risk of being relegated to the domestic arbitration tribunals,
232 Swedish Arbitral Award Enforced in Beijing, supra note 230.
233 Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, supra note 127. See New York Convention art. V.
There are a number of conditions under which enforcement of a foreign arbitration award may be declined,
including where the agreement is invalid, the losing party was not notified of the proceedings, the matter or
arbitration procedure was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement, or the award had been set aside
by the courts of the country making the award. Id. § 1. Courts may decline to enforce if the subject matter
is not arbitrable under the laws of the country in which enforcement is sought, or where "recognition or
enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Id. § 2.
234 China's Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution, supra note 88.
235 Statement of Robert Aronson, supra note 92.
236 Id. An award was made in favor of RevPower by the Swedish Arbitration Institute on July 13,
1993. The assets of the state-owned company were transferred to parent and grandparent companies during
the delay in enforcement by the Chinese courts. The "Chinese laugh at New York Convention..." Id. It
came as a surprise in 1998 when the People's Intermediate Court accepted a Swedish arbitration award for
enforcement two years after application for enforcement. Swedish Arbitral Award Enforced in Beijing,
supra note 230. A two million US dollar award against a Chinese business was obtained in April 1995.
RevPower applied to the Chinese court in November 1995 and the application was accepted for
enforcement in November 1997. Id. See also Creditor Banks Win Control of Olympic, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22024272. On October 27, 1998, the Chinese Middle Court
affirmed a 1995 CIETAC decision allowing a bank to take over a hotel that had defaulted on loans. Id.
237 Gigon, supra note 223. The French company was Tetras. See also Brown & Rogers, supra note
2, at 341.
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and whatever Chinese tribunal is used, foreigners risk significant bias and local
protectionism. Most likely, the same forces that make it difficult for a foreign
party to obtain and enforce an arbitral award will make it easy for a Chinese
party to obtain and enforce an award against a foreigner. Chinese parties are
more likely to initiate arbitration to force a settlement than are foreign parties,
perhaps due to the Chinese parties' better chances of success.238
Although Chinese enforcement of awards favoring foreigners is
challenging, Chinese arbitration awards against foreigners are recognized in
more than ninety other countries, and have been successfully enforced in
over seventy cases.239 For example, if the arbitration tribunal finds in favor
of a Chinese party against a U.S. corporation, the award will likely be
enforced in the U.S. courts. 240 The United States has been a strong supporter
of international arbitration, and has passed significant legislation to support
enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, even where domestic law would
not allow an award. 24 1  The Federal Arbitration Act implements the New
York Convention and makes foreign arbitral awards involving commercial
matters enforceable in the United States.242 The United States Code requires
confirmation of awards by foreign countries that are party to the New York
Convention except in limited circumstances.
243
23 Guo XIAOWEN, supra note 17, at iv. In 1988, the Chinese party brought 58 percent of disputes at
CIETAC, and the foreign party brought 42 percent. Id.
'39 Id. at vii.
240 Edward Lehner, China Revisited, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 1997. The author states: "Arbitration awards
of the Shanghai Arbitration Tribunal have generally been enforced in [U.S.] courts." Id.
24' Erik Langeland, The Viability of Conciliation in International Dispute Resolution, 50 DISP.
RESOL. J. 34, 37 (1995). The US is a strong supporter of international arbitration and has upheld
international awards where comparable domestic law would not allow. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
encouraged the emergence of strong regime of international arbitration, saying the national courts need to
"shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration" and need to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under
domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court stated it would be
necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring commercial arbitration. Id.
242 Carter, supra note 3, at 7. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). See Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ch. 2, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (implementing the
New York Convention. See the Federal Arbitration Act, ch. I (giving standards for vacating awards from
other countries which include: 1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; 2)
partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; 3) misconduct by arbitrators, lack of due process, or ex parte
communications; 4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers or misapplied them. Manifest disregard of
applicable law is a judicially created additional ground for refusal to enforce a foreign arbitration award.).
243 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 which requires confirmation of awards by foreign courts that are party to the
New York Convention unless one of seven grounds for refusal or deferral specified in the convention are
met. The opponent to recognition of an award carries the burden of proof. The grounds are as follows: 1)
invalidity of the arbitration agreement due to party incapacity or if the agreement is illegal; 2) lack of notice
or opportunity to present case; 3) the award deals with matters beyond the submission; 4) the tribunal or its
procedures fail to follow the arbitration agreement or local law; 5) the award is not binding in the country
where it was decided; 6) the subject is not capable of settlement in the U.S. by arbitration; 7) public policy
of the U.S. prohibits enforcement. Id. art. V(2)(b).
FOREIGNERS ARBITRATING IN CHINA
A Chinese arbitration award against a foreign party from a nation that
is a signatory to the New York Convention is easier to enforce against a
foreign party than a Chinese court judgment.244  Enforcement of court
awards depends on a network of bilateral treaties which provide poor
international coverage. 245 China is party to few of these treaties, which do
not include major trading. artners like the United States, Japan, Germany,
and the United Kingdom.
Moreover, pursuant to the New York Convention, arbitration awards
of the Shanghai arbitration tribunal have been enforced by U.S. 
courts.
2 4 7
Whether a U.S. court will enforce a judgment from a Chinese court is not
clearly settled, with the U.S. court required to consider the fairness of the
practice of the particular Chinese court.2 4 8 In contrast, Chinese arbitration
awards are unconditionally enforceable in the 130 member countries of the
New York Convention. 249 The result is that foreign parties could find it
much easier to protect assets in their own country from a Chinese court
award than from a Chinese arbitration award. Foreign investors risk may be
reduced by refusing arbitration as a dispute resolution process and forcing
the dispute into the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Foreign investors should be aware of the risks they assume when
entering into agreements with the Chinese to arbitrate disputes. Given the
lack of conformance of the Chinese arbitration process with the norms of the
international business community, the usual benefits expected from
arbitration are unlikely to be present. In China, "arbitration has become so
expensive, time-consuming and marked by difficult-to-enforce awards, 25 °
that foreign investors should choose alternate dispute resolution methods.
The questions surrounding whether the domestic or international tribunal
would preside over disputes with foreign-related parties reduces the certainty
commonly associated with the arbitration process. The Chinese arbitration
process can be time consuming, expensive, and strongly biased against
244 Carter, supra note 3, at 1.
243 Crawford, supra note 15, at 26.
246 Id. The difficulty of enforcing Chinese court awards outside of China is often considered a
problem with litigation as a dispute resolution process. Id.
247 Lehner, supra note 240.
248 id.
249 China: Business Booms for China's Arbitrators, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 16, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7594192.
250 Fernandez & Spoltner, supra note 9, at 68.
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foreign parties, making arbitration an unsatisfactory dispute resolution
process for many foreign investors. Enforcement difficulties foreign parties
may experience in the Chinese courts can turn a successful arbitral award
into hollow victory. Foreign investors' interests are not protected by
arbitration as currently practiced in China.
The current state of foreign-related arbitration in China indicates that if
a Chinese party does not choose to participate in the arbitration tribunal, or
chooses not to comply with an award from a tribunal, the foreign party has
little recourse. If the foreign party wins it will not likely be able to enforce
payment. If a foreign party loses in any Chinese arbitration tribunal, the
Chinese courts will likely enforce the award, and the Chinese party stands an
excellent chance of pursuing enforcement in the foreigner's home country if it
is party to the New York Convention. Therefore, foreign investors entering
into business in China may be better protected absent an arbitration agreement,
because it will make pursuit by Chinese parties of the foreign based assets
more difficult. Refusing to enter into an arbitration agreement to settle
disputes with the Chinese may be the foreign investors' best course of action.
